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Information Sharing in Insecure 
Environments was held May 21-25, 2006, 
in Monterey, California. Representatives 
from nongovernmental organizations; 
intergovernmental organizations; 
government civilian agencies; and the 
armed forces of the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Germany gathered to discuss 
organizational and industry imperatives, 
learn about current and past initiatives, 
and create new models for improving 
information sharing and enhancing 
cooperation in insecure environments.
This event was hosted by CSRS and 
was cosponsored by the International 
Organization for Migration and the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Stability Operations.
The Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) 
is a teaching institute which 
develops and hosts educational 
programs for stabilization and reconstruction 
practitioners operating around the globe. 
Established by the Naval Postgraduate School 
in 2004 through the vision and congressional 
support of Congressman Sam Farr, CSRS 
creates a wide array of programs to foster 
dialogue among practitioners, as well as help 
them develop new strategies and refi ne best 
practices to improve the effectiveness of their 
important global work.
 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes to 
the university’s research and graduate degree 
programs. For more information about CSRS, 
its philosophy, and programs, please visit 
www.nps.edu/csrs. 
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About the Cosponsors
The International 
Organization for Migration 
works to help ensure 
the orderly and humane 
management of migration, 
to promote international cooperation on 
migration issues, to assist in the search for 
practical solutions to migration problems, 
and to provide humanitarian assistance 
to migrants in need, including refugees 
and internally displaced people. For more 
information, please visit IOM online at 
www.iom.int. 
The Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense 
for Stability Operations 
oversees the development 
of Department of Defense, 
interagency, and international capabilities for 
U.S. stability operations missions worldwide. 
This includes updating and securing 
authorities to build partnership capacity 
to meet the needs of the war on terror and 
stabilization and reconstruction missions. 
The offi ce manages a $300 million train 
and equip authority for the Department; 
coordinates DoD humanitarian assistance 
missions and responses to natural disasters; 
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Executive Summary
Escalating confl ict in Darfur. A 
devastating earthquake in Kashmir. And 
the deadliest tsunami in history. Across 
the globe, humanitarian emergencies are 
increasing. Needs are vast and operations 
ever more complex. Time-pressed and 
resource-constrained, relief actors fi nd 
themselves on the front lines, working 
to rebuild communities and ameliorate 
human suffering. These groups, which 
include intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, US and 
foreign governments, and the armed forces, 
often fi nd themselves occupying the same 
space and pursuing similar objectives. 
Ideally, this would lead to increased 
cooperation and collaboration. Often, 
however, the reverse is true. 
Organizations bring a wide array of 
perspectives and processes to their fi eld 
work. Competing or overlapping mandates, 
operational guidelines, and biases can 
make it diffi cult to share information or 
even work with other organizations. As a 
general rule, nongovernmental organizations 
have historically been reluctant to share 
information with armed forces, fearing that 
doing so may compromise their neutrality 
and jeopardize staff safety. In turn, the 
armed forces have often withheld or delayed 
release of critical data to improve their 
ability to protect the force or deal effectively 
with belligerents. 
Despite these and other challenges, 
information sharing among the various 
communities does occur. Unfortunately, 
it tends to be on an ad hoc, unplanned 
basis and often emerges from personal 
relationships that are developed on the 
ground. As individuals begin to make 
contacts, build trust, and identify ways 
they can share information, new networks 
emerge. However, these networks are often 
temporary and situational, with frequent 
rotation of personnel. Not surprisingly, 
most ultimately disappear when the crisis 
is over and organizations leave the field. 
As a result, the larger relief community 
misses out on an opportunity to learn 
about new strategies and use best 
practices in future initiatives. 
Institutional mechanisms which foster 
cooperation among organizations do exist. 
Chief among them are the United Nations’ 
Humanitarian Information Centers and 
the US Army’s Civil-Military Operations 
Centers. However, there is much we 
can do to improve these models. In this 
workshop, we looked at the wide array of 
organizations and tools we currently use 
to share data, analyzed real-life examples 
of information sharing in the fi eld, and 
created new strategies and action plans 
to break down barriers to cooperation 
and improve our preparedness and 
responsiveness for humanitarian crises. Since 
information sharing is a massive enterprise, 
our recommendations focus on a larger 
time continuum than the emergency itself. 
Pre-crisis planning work and post-crisis 
assessments are invaluable to optimizing 
information sharing in the fi eld and helping 
institutionalize processes all groups can use.
With their constantly changing conditions and security risks, insecure environments are a natural 
focal point for information sharing initiatives. Participants gathered to discuss current initiatives 

















Participants developed the following 
ﬁ ndings and recommendations:
•  After years of mistrust and avoidance, 
some relief actors are increasingly willing 
to bridge cultural differences and create 
new ways of sharing information and 
cooperating in the fi eld while not violating 
organizational redlines. 
•  Organizations are realizing that better 
information sharing can improve their 
effectiveness in times of crisis by aligning 
groups around common goals, focusing 
resources on the areas of greatest need, and 
reducing duplicative or counterproductive 
programs. However, information sharing 
initiatives need to respect the independence 
and autonomy of participant organizations. 
•  Insecure environments are a natural venue 
for cross-agency information sharing. With 
their continually changing operational 
conditions, insecure environments often 
pose a threat to the safety and security of 
humanitarian actors as well as the victims 
of crisis they serve. Sharing accurate, 
timely information can improve security 
conditions for all participants, as well as 
enhance their responsiveness.
•  While information sharing mechanisms do 
exist, they are often local, personalized, and 
ad hoc. As a consequence, it can be diffi cult 
or impossible to apply them globally or 
in other theaters of action. Additionally, 
practitioners in the fi eld often fail to create 
transition plans or effective handoffs to 
local peers, meaning that programs may not 
function effectively, or may cease altogether 
when there is turnover in personnel or when 
organizations depart.
•  To succeed, information sharing tools 
and models must be simple, fl exible, and 
scalable, as well as used by a majority of 
participants. Organizations should develop 
common data defi nitions, standards, and 
assessment forms to improve information 
sharing and usability. Additionally, they 
should create mechanisms to capture lessons 
Executive Summary
A workshop group’s 
perspective on how 
information is shared 
in the ﬁ eld. Participants 
stressed that information 
ﬂ ows both horizontally 
and vertically, between 
global and ﬁ eld actors. 
The result? A model 
that resembles a 3-D 
chessboard. 
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learned from global and fi eld initiatives and 
share them with all participants.
•  The most pressing needs include data 
standards, pre-crisis planning, practitioner 
training, and best practices. Humanitarian 
actors focus their activities on responsiveness, 
as this is the area of greatest visibility to 
donors and most pressing need during times 
of crisis. However, they also need to improve 
preparedness. By the time groups reach the 
fi eld, it’s often too late to implement new 
tools. Consequently, practitioners either 
revert to old processes or use new tools 
incorrectly or ineffectively.
•  Additionally, we need to enhance 
our understanding of relief actors’ 
organizational cultures and processes. This 
important work can occur during joint 
workshops and through service to advisory 
boards and standards-setting organizations. 
We recommend creating joint military-
humanitarian training in established 
military education contexts to increase 
mutual awareness of each other’s mandates 
and work processes. We also advocate the 
participation of NGOs in the relief advance 
planning sessions typically conducted by the 
armed forces.
•  Participants were divided on whether to 
create new organizations, such as pre-crisis 
working groups, strategic planning advisory 
boards, and crisis planning centers of 
excellence, or to continue working through 
existing structures. However, participants 
concurred that current information sharing 
groups need to evolve if they are to 
meet information sharing needs. Current 
structures aren’t used to their potential 
due to unclear mandates, a lack of 
perceived value, or cultural differences. 
These organizations will need to make 
systemic changes to gain wider 
acceptance and usage of their tools. 
•  To move from ad hoc information sharing 
to institutionalized processes, we need 
better funding and strong commitment: 
from global and national policymakers, 
to donors, to inter-agency alliances, to the 
relief actors who implement new tools in 
the fi eld. 
•  Finally, we need to educate our community 
on the importance of new information 
sharing initiatives, using inter-agency 
workshops and training sessions and 
marketing initiatives to build support at 
all levels, ensure effective deployment, 
and capture lessons learned and best 
practices that can be used by the global 
relief community. 
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Major Basil Catanzaro, 
United States Civil 
Affairs Command, talks 
with Susan MacGregor 
of AirServ.
Workshop Overview
How does information get shared in 
humanitarian emergencies, from a crisis’s 
initial warning signs to its escalation and 
aftermath? How should it get shared? And 
how do security conditions complicate 
information sharing and decision making 
in the fi eld? These pressing questions 
brought together representatives from 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); 
government civilian agencies; and the armed 
forces of the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Germany to discuss current practices, 
collaborate on problem solving exercises, and 
begin to construct new models. During the 
workshop’s three phases, participants were 
challenged to critique existing information 
sharing models, including their own, and 
think creatively about new constructs that 
would solve information sharing challenges, 
while optimizing use of current tools and 
structures. The three-day workshop was 
constructed in three phases:
Phase One: In the fi rst phase, several 
speakers presented the global organizational 
perspectives of key actors – including the 
US State Department; United Nations; US 
Army; and InterAction, the leading alliance of 
nongovernmental organizations – while others 
showcased fi eld initiatives in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iraq. Presenters discussed how 
initiatives were planned and structured and 
analyzed their successes and shortcomings. 
Next, they facilitated a group discussion of the 
achievements and limitations of their model, 
and any regrets they had about its use to 
date. Finally, they offered strategies for how 
others could improve the model in subsequent 
implementations. These presentations are 
highlighted in Phase One: Current Initiatives, 
pages 6 to 24. As short summaries, these case 
studies may not capture all the nuances of 
presenters’ talks. Interested readers should 
also consult speaker presentations, which are 
available on the event DVD. 
Phase Two: During the second phase of 
the workshop, participants were given a 
scenario to work with: a humanitarian crisis 
in the fi ctional African country of Aliya. 
The challenge was to create an ideal model 
for sharing and managing information 
among all the relief organizations working 
in the area. Breakout groups featured a 
mix of organizations, mirroring conditions 
participants would experience in the fi eld.
The groups created four models for 
information sharing that considered the 
needs of multiple organizations, a continually 
changing operational environment, and best 
practices from the earlier presentations. 
Summaries are presented in Phase Two: 
Designing Ideal Information Sharing Models 
on pages 25 to 29. 
Phase Three: To move from theory to reality, 
workshop participants were directed to 
propose ten initiatives that would build 
towards their ideal models. After discussing 
the ten programs and their potential impact, 
participants selected fi ve for further work and 
considered how they could be operationalized. 
Action plans are summarized in Phase Three: 
Action Planning on pages 30 to 36. 
Information Sharing in Insecure Environments helped participants learn more about current 
initiatives, design new models for information sharing, and understand what it would take to 
operationalize their plans. 
Current Initiatives
The stabilization and reconstruction 
community is not currently where it could 
be – and where it needs to be – with sharing 
and managing information in complex 
emergencies. Three factors, all of which are 
beyond practitioner control, affect and shape 
the information sharing environment:
 
•  Security Situation: Security on the 
ground can range from an insecure but 
permissive environment such as Sumatra, 
to a high intensity confl ict environment 
such as Iraq. The level of security may be 
the most important factor affecting each 
community’s willingness and ability to 
share meaningful information.
 
•  Actors present: Key players represent 
diverse organizations with wide-ranging 
expectations around how information 
will be collected and shared. They include 
organizations with thousands of players as 
well as those representing just a few.
•  Information sharing structure: 
Mechanisms range from ad hoc 
meetings that lack formalized support 
to established, supported centers such as 
United Nations (UN) cluster meetings, 
UN Humanitarian Information Centers 
(HICs), and the UN Joint Logistics 
Center. Nongovernmental organizational 
centers include Internet cafés, the Joint 
NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative, 
Humanitarian Operation Centers, and 
Humanitarian Assistance Centers. In 
addition, the armed forces operate 
Civil-Military Operation Centers.
Our information mechanisms have evolved 
in the past several years, as global crises have 
increased in both number and severity. In 
Bosnia, representatives from many different 
communities were involved in stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts, but lacked 
procedures or doctrine that enabled them to 
share information. In Kosovo, the accidental 
and fortuitous location of the armed forces, 
NGOs, and IGOs – all of whom were 
located on the same street – enabled closer 
communication and cooperation. 
Perhaps the most signifi cant recent 
innovation has been the fi elding of UN-led 
HICs. Lynette Larsen of the UN Offi ce for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) established the fi rst HIC which 
then developed the Rapid Village Assessment 
process. Relief practitioners have urged that 
the HIC be used as a model operation for 
other post-confl ict and emergency response 
situations. Deployed globally since 2000, 
with both successes and failures, the HIC has 
recently served as a mechanism to organize 
groups responding to the Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami.
As groups establish working relationships in 
the fi eld, they often face diffi culties defi ning 
their information sharing responsibilities vis 
a vis other organizations’ responsibilities. To 
move beyond ad hoc processes, organizations 
should consider their decision making needs 
in the light of such critical variables as 
decision frequency, analysis requirements, 
staff involvement, collection processes, 
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data. By thoroughly exploring these needs, 
organizations will be better able to defi ne 
their roles and responsibilities, make cost-
effective decisions about information 
collection, and work with other groups to 
improve inter-agency information sharing. 
As we assess our information sharing 
practices, it’s important to look at what 
different groups have achieved. These 
organizations include:
•  The Mine Action Community: As the Mine 
Action Community has widened its focus 
from local work to global initiatives, it 
has done a good job of including all the 
relevant players including the Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation, Mine 
Action Group, the United Nations Mine 
Action Service, and the Information 
Management System for Mine Action. 
Additionally, the Mine Action Committee 
was extremely intentional in designing 
information sharing products and 
processes, creating an initiative that 
is effective and global in scope. This 
program has become a standard for what 
can be achieved. 
•  The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees’ Field Information 
Coordination Support Section has 
created a robust framework for information 
sharing with standards, tools, guidelines, 
training, and analytics to support and 
build capacity in both fi eld operations 
and headquarters. It also provides 
data consolidation, verifi cation, and 
statistical analysis and has a commitment 
to publishing and sharing work with 
partners, donors, and the greater public. 
Additionally, this group is committed to 
active outreach and cooperation with a 
wide body of stakeholders. 
•  United Nations Common Services: 
HICs and the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Center provide robust 
information sharing programs. 
•  The US Department of Defense practices 
information management techniques 
through routine training, games, and 
exercises to ensure that organizations will 
use best practices during emergencies. As 
an example, General Blackman’s directive 
to keep information unclassifi ed during 
the tsunami response enabled offi cers 
on the USS Abraham Lincoln to share 
overhead imagery of western Sumatran 
road conditions with the HIC and other 
organizations 24 hours after images were 
taken. The importance of civil information 
management is underscored by US Army 
Civil Affairs doctrine, which states it as 
one of its fi ve core tasks. 
•  The US State Department’s Humanitarian 
Information Unit is a US Government 
interagency unit working on systematizing 
key processes including identifying, 
collecting, analyzing, and sharing data
for decision support in humanitarian 
response and reconstruction.
Relief actors should 
consider their decision 
making needs against 
an array of critical 
variables, understanding 
that ﬁ eld needs and 
conditions change on 
an ongoing basis.
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•  Best Practices in Humanitarian Information 
Exchange Symposia: Field practitioners 
gather regularly to discuss their experiences, 
share successes, and learn from past 
mistakes to build better practices.
•  The Emergency Capacity Building 
Initiative: Information and Technology 
Issues in Emergency Response is a 
consortium of seven NGOs, including 
Oxfam, Mercy Corps, the International 
Rescue Committee, World Vision, Care, 
Save the Children, and Catholic Relief 
Services, which have received funding from 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and 
Microsoft to improve information sharing 
processes and technologies. 
 
•  George Washington University’s Institute 
for Disaster, Crisis and Risk Management 
is developing a concept of humanitarian 
geographic information systems (GIS) data 
model to standardize data collection and its 
display. This concept supports UNOCHA’s 
core geospatial requirements and dovetails 
with data models developed by other UN 
agencies and NGOs.
•  The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is 
addressing the issues of common defi nitions, 
standards and assessment. This committee 
includes UN and non-UN organizations, 
such as UNOCHA, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, the 
United Nations Children’s Fund, the 
United Nations Development Programme, 
InterAction, the International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.
While multiple organizations are making 
important headway on developing and 
testing models in the fi eld, these models 
have not yet become established procedure 
for the relief community. As a consequence, 
we need to identify the obstacles that 
are preventing us from moving forward, 
whether they are constraints due to a lack of 
leadership, insuffi cient investment, a lack of 
practitioner skill sets, or the need for better 
strategies. There are pockets of successes 
across all our organizations; however, many 
of these achievements have been due to 
successful personal relationships. If we are 
to institutionalize information management, 
we will need to make changes internally and 
within and across communities. 
The Group’s Perspective 
After hearing from Ms. Arkedis and Ms. 
Miner, the group discussed how organizations 
had moved beyond debating the importance 
of information sharing to collaborating 
on creating effective solutions. Accidental 
successes in the fi eld have given way to 
new structures, and the Internet is enabling 
greater discussion and openness. In addition, 
a growing number of initiatives are seeking 
to defi ne and share key processes through 
common assessments and structures such as 
the HIC. Information sharing between the 
armed forces and civilian communities – long 
a thorny issue – has been improving as the 
armed forces revise doctrine to allow greater 
openness in relief situations.
Despite recent strides, organizations are 
still not sharing information as openly, 
effectively, and systematically as they should. 
Organizations often collect excessive or 
duplicative information without fully 
assessing the costs and benefi ts of collection. 
This problem is especially acute during crises, 
when groups revert to past processes. In 
addition, data collection and sharing processes 
are still highly individualized, and attempts 
to standardize and coordinate these processes 
have proved inadequate to date.
The path forward is through focus and 
standardization. Organizations need to 
If we are to institutionalize information 
management, we will need to make changes 
internally and within and across communities. 
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determine which data points they truly require 
and how they will use them. Additionally, 
we should identify and mitigate information 
sharing constraints, such as cultural differences, 
duplicative initiatives, staff issues, and a lack 
of documentation and dissemination of best 
practices. To replicate success on a large scale, 
we must agree on common data categories 
to share, create a common data model, and 
standardize key processes. 
So how do we get there? Inter-agency 
cooperation can help pave the way by 
enabling access to HICs, improving online 
access in austere environments, and hosting 
workshops to address and break down 
cultural parallels. At the next level, we need 
to identify organizational responsibilities and 
institutionalize policies for standardization 
and information sharing among relief 
organizations in the fi eld. To increase the 
armed forces’ participation in information 
sharing initiatives, we should begin with 
non-combat response scenarios.  This will 
remove a signifi cant obstacle from the 
discussion. Then, once basic agreements have 
been reached, we can determine information 
sharing and management changes that 
are needed when the security situation 
deteriorates and the military becomes 
involved in confl ict. 
After obtaining community buy-in on 
common data needs and roles, inter-
agency alliances should standardize and 
institutionalize information sharing practices 
and tools. Key requirements include standards 
for software, grid zone designators, metrics, 
data defi nitions, collection guidelines, and 
common formats. A lead organization should 
oversee information sharing and knowledge 
management at each disaster site and 
disseminate best practices, so that responders 
know where to obtain data and what has 
worked well elsewhere. 
 
Within organizations, leaders should 
spearhead vertical information sharing 
to improve policy and decision making. 
By communicating the importance of 
information as a decision support tool 
and a capacity builder, we will increase 
commitment to building next generation 
tools and evolving our practices. 
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The path forward with information sharing lies 
through focus and standardization. To replicate 
success on a large scale, we will need to create 
shared data categories, a common data model, 
and standardized processes.
Dr. Nancy Roberts of 
the Naval Postgraduate 
School (left) and 
Gerry Schwaller, Monterey 
Institute of International 
Studies (right), listen 
to presenters describe 
current information 
sharing initiatives.
As we analyze the information sharing 
environment in Iraq, it’s important to 
realize that there are some critical 
differences between the armed forces and 
the humanitarian community’s levels of 
action. These two groups use different 
terminology and categorize fi eld initiatives 
differently. This can complicate information 
sharing at its most basic level. 
Information sharing is not about centralizing 
control, but about identifying shared needs 
and using standardized tools to meet the 
needs of the larger group. Participants have 
legitimate and necessary needs for autonomy; 
however, there are benefi ts to identifying 
common information requirements and using 
common assessments. 
To create shared goals, organizations should 
design desired outputs fi rst, as they will drive 
data requirements. Next, they must consider 
how data outputs will contribute to creating 
and maintaining the common operational 
picture. And fi nally, organizations should 
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Building the Health Information Sharing Framework in Iraq, 
May 2003: Practical Successes with Assessment, Information 
Sharing, and Coordination
The Health Information 
Sharing Framework
The Health Assessment 
Coordination Team 
created a set of minimum 
information requirements 
that leveraged existing 
data, ensured common 
classiﬁ cation, and enabled 
equal access to data. 
if data gathering and sharing processes are 
too intensive, they may not be sustainable for 
either the organization or the group. 
Common assessments haven’t yet hit the 
mark: Too general, and they go unused; too 
broad-ranging, and they become rapidly 
obsolete. Adding to the complexity is the 
fact that no sector has yet defi ned its 
mission-critical data requirements. 
Recent work in Basra focused on assessing 
health information requirements for Southern 
Iraq in May 2003. The complex operational 
environment, with its multiple requirements, 
distractions, and players, forced the team 
to focus on immediate information needs. 
Relief actors needed information that would 
enhance delivery of health services, assess the 
current state of health infrastructure, assist 
with surveillance, and improve drug and 
consumable supplies management. 
The relief community included a wide array 
of stakeholder organizations, each with its 
own data requirements and forms. As these 
groups struggled to respond to the crisis, 
they duplicated each other’s efforts and 
created unmanageable data requirements, 
while failing to contribute to a larger-
scale operational picture. For example, 
one hospital in Um Qasr was assessed 
13 different times without ever receiving 
assistance, while no organization could 
defi nitively state how many primary health 
care facilities were in place. In addition, 
plans to standardize assessment lacked 
practicality. The World Health Organization 
designed and tried to implement a twenty-
page survey form, but there was no plan, 
budget, or staff to leverage the data it 
generated.  With so many duplicative efforts 
and wasted resources, the health community 
became angry and disenchanted. 
What we needed was a rapid solution to gather 
critical data to improve decision making, 
build towards a common operational picture, 
systematize coordination and collaboration, 
and improve the occupying authorities’ ability 
to regulate large contractors. 
The Health Assessment Coordination Team, 
a group which included key stakeholders, 
quickly worked to clarify unique 
organizational requirements versus shared 
group needs and create a set of minimum 
information requirements. The group 
sought to leverage existing data and develop 
effective structures and owners that would 
ensure common classifi cation and enable 
equal access to the data. Data collection and 
management was simplifi ed to minimize 
ambiguity, avoid confusion, and reduce effort. 
The team created a simple system to classify 
and describe each health facility, including 
infrastructure, medical equipment, number of 
beds, rate of daily consultations, and degree 
of facility destruction. Within one month of 
implementation, the team had compiled all 
necessary data from multiple organizations 
using a simple one-page spreadsheet 
that could be e-mailed to any requester, 
maintained by a secretary, and hand-delivered 
to the HIC for use in creating maps. The 
tool’s simplicity, and the timeliness of data 
delivery, won inter-agency buy-in. Presented 
and accepted in Baghdad as a national model 
in August 2003, the product is now being 
implemented by USAID contractors. 
Successes
What made this tool successful where 
others have failed? 
The team used realistic requirements to 
drive tool design and focused on common 
information requirements. Since operating 
environments and their structural, spatial, 
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Before the Health Information Sharing Network 
was implemented in Iraq, organizations 
duplicated each other’s efforts. One hospital 
in Um Qasr was assessed 13 times without 
ever receiving assistance.
and temporal imperatives will change over 
time, information systems and structures 
should be designed for easy revision and 
maintenance. While project data can be 
abstracted from operational assessments, 
the converse is not true. Consequently, 
information organizers must focus on the 
highest-level, shared purpose. 
Involving stakeholders upfront increased 
their buy-in and usage of the new tool. 
The team matched information sharing 
obligations to input requirements and 
guaranteed that all stakeholders would 
have access to resulting data. 
The tool’s simplicity ensured that it could be 
easily used, adapted, and scaled. It could be 
easily accessed via e-mail or distributed via 
“sneaker net.” It employed a user-friendly 
health assessment classifi cation system with 
standardized names, data sets, and forms. 
Shortcomings
Although the tool was successfully deployed 
in Basra, its impact to date has been purely 
local and time-limited. The template was not 
institutionalized and has not been replicated 
elsewhere. When the security situation 
worsened, the humanitarian organizations 
left the area. Since the team hadn’t included 
Iraqis and legal benefi ciaries as stakeholders 
or designed a transition plan, the tool wasn’t 
handed off to the local health community. 
As a consequence, the tool is no longer in 
use, and the institutional memory for this 
initiative has been lost. 
Additionally, this tool was an ad hoc solution, 
overlaying a new template on existing data. 
The team had no way to vet data, determine 
its reliability, or create an informational 
hierarchy. They had no policies to guide the 
development process; nor was there a means 
to capture innovative ideas that arose during 
the design and implementation phase. 
Moving Forward
Even with its limitations, the tool provides 
an excellent framework for information 
gathering and sharing. We recommend that 
the model be published so that it can be 
replicated, and so that new users can evolve 
processes and develop lessons learned. 
To ensure that the tool is successful and 
adopted by the host nation, the relief response 
community should involve local leaders 
in advance planning, design a transition 
plan, and make sure the tool is handed off 
effectively. Users should collect and maintain 
data to address a single, complex problem. 
This will enable users to demonstrate results 
rapidly and prevent assessment fatigue. 
Additionally, users should protect their 
sources to prevent reprisals for sharing 
potentially controversial information. 
Implementers should involve stakeholders 
at multiple levels of leadership in designing 
the tool to obtain their buy-in. They should 
also decide whether to take a single-sector 
or multi-sector approach to designing 
assessment, and appoint a lead organization 
to head up standards development and 
implementation. Lastly, information should 
be freely available to all, to improve cross-
organization decision making and increase 
community commitment to the initiative. 
The Health Information Sharing Network in Iraq 
was a simple, one-page spreadsheet that could 
be accessed via e-mail, completed by a secretary, 
and distributed via “sneaker net.”
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The Afghanistan NGO Security Offi ce 
(ANSO) was created to enhance the 
safety and security of NGO workers in 
Afghanistan. Sponsored by the International 
Rescue Committee since 2003, ANSO is 
open to all NGOs operating in the country. 
From its fi ve offi ces located throughout 
Afghanistan, ANSO provides information, 
analysis, and advice on security issues; 
acts as a bridge between NGOs and armed 
forces; and builds capacity through training 
and workshops. 
ANSO works with three distinct 
communities – NGOs, the armed forces, 
and the UN – providing different services 
to assist these organizations with carrying 
out their missions. In its work with NGOs, 
ANSO shares information that might have 
an impact on NGO operations, conducts 
threat and risk analyses, and provides 
other safety and security information. This 
content, which is gathered from a wide array 
of sources, takes the form of mapping data 
as well as trends and pattern analysis. It 
favors speed over precision, to ensure the 
safety and well-being of NGO workers.
ANSO also shares data with the armed forces, 
serving as a conduit between the military and 
NGOs to help maintain their independence. 
ANSO provides information on NGO roles, 
missions, and guiding principles. Information 
sharing varies both in quantity and in type. 
For example, when ANSO worked with 
coalition forces on Operation Enduring 
Freedom, data exchange was extremely 
limited, personalized, and more “take” than 
“give” to reinforce that ANSO was perceived 
by locals as independent of coalition forces. 
Presenter:
Eric le Guen




The International Rescue Committee and the ANSO 
(Afghanistan NGO Security Office) Model
ANSO’s Role
Created to enhance 
NGO safety and security 
in Afghanistan, ANSO 
provides security 
updates, serves as an 
intermediary between 
NGOs and the armed 
forces, and builds 
capacity through training 
and workshops. 
ANSO’s cooperation with the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which 
was more of a peacekeeping entity under 
the control of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was more “give” with 
little “take.” However, information exchange 
was complicated by the need to include 
multiple players. 
ANSO’s attempts to share information with 
the UN Department of Safety and Security 
got off to a rocky start due to perceived 
competition. Once this issue was addressed, 
relations between the two organizations 
improved signifi cantly. 
Since 2004, ANSO has published the 
ANSO Weekly Security Bulletin, which has 
over 600 subscribers; successfully liaised 
with security actors including NGOs, ISAF, 
coalition forces, police, and other security 
actors; held eight security trainings; and 
established a nationwide communications 
network of HF and VHF radios which link 
all fi ve ANSO offi ces.
ANSO’s Future
So what does the future hold for ANSO and 
organizations of its kind? In Afghanistan, 
ANSO’s lead agency, the International Rescue 
Committee, is transferring responsibility for 
ANSO to Germany’s InterAction to ensure 
that it continues to operate successfully. And 
across the world, ANSO-like systems are 
operating in Iraq, Liberia, Bande Aceh, Sudan, 
and Chad.
Successes
A fi rst-of-its-kind initiative for NGOs, 
ANSO delivered results. Recognizing that 
information sharing is security, ANSO helped 
create a more stable security environment 
for NGOs working on the ground. NGOs in 
Afghanistan rated it as their primary source 
of security information and used it as their 
fi rst reporting mechanism for incidents. 
As a consequence, it was the fi rst to report 
incidents and threats. 
ANSO also fi lled a vital role, sharing 
security information among all relevant 
communities, including the armed forces 
and the UN. Well-recognized and trusted, 
ANSO helped bridge the gap between these 
communities and became an effective liaison 
between them.
ANSO’s success was due to its clearly 
defi ned responsibilities, its open information 
sharing procedures, and its targeted 
information products. It provided specifi c 
information – situational awareness, incident 
reports, weekly briefs, and emergency 
communications – that NGOs could use, 
which led to follow-up efforts in places that 
the audits identifi ed as dangerous. It also 
defi ned information requirements such as 
transportation in high risk areas. 
ANSO provided vital liaison services, hosting 
workshop and training sessions for all 
key players, developing written memos of 
understanding or verbal agreements between 
NGO security offi ces and armed forces, and 
working with local governments and security 
Brian Kelly, International 
Organization for 
Migration (left) talks 
with Lawrence Busha, 
Naval Postgraduate 
School (center), and 
Bailey Hand, Ofﬁ ce 
of the Secretary of 
Defense for Stability 
Operations (right).
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forces to ensure their proper understanding of 
the purpose of data sharing initiatives. 
Shortcomings
While ANSO succeeded in improving 
the security environment for NGOs, it 
experienced diffi culties sharing information 
with the coalition forces, who tended to take 
more than they gave. This was exacerbated 
by the fact that there was no formal plan 
for interaction with the international armed 
forces. Additionally, the UN was resistant 
to sharing information with the NGOs, 
and some of the NGOs refused to cooperate 
with ANSO. 
Other issues included insuffi cient funding, 
which limited ANSO’s geographic reach; a 
reliance on unoffi cial contacts as information 
sources; and a focus on speed over accuracy 
for information dissemination. Additionally, 
misunderstandings between involved groups 
meant that information was not used as 
effectively as it could have been. ANSO would 
be viable as a model for the future only if 
it were a well-funded, large-scale operation 
whose design considered and overcame the 
shortcomings addressed in this presentation. 
Moving Forward 
To improve on the ANSO model, 
organizations should increase information 
accuracy and introduce better mapping, risk 
analysis, and trend analysis techniques. Of 
equal importance, organizations need funding 
to conduct training for groups in the fi eld 
and implement technology and other tools. 
Finally, organizations should replicate ANSO-
like structures in different theatres of concern 
to determine its applicability to other aid 
issues and security situations.
Participants received the United States Institute 
of Peace’s fact-ﬁ nding report on ANSO prior to 
the workshop. This report is available at: 
http://www.itcm.org/pdf/Field_Report.pdf. 
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Participants listen to 
presenter highlights of 
current information 
sharing initiatives. 
Current efforts in UN humanitarian 
emergency response systems are based on 
UN General Assembly Resolution 46/18 
passed on December 19, 1991. The resolution 
requested that fi ve key functions and 
structures be established: an Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, a Central Emergency Revolving 
Fund, an Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC), consolidated appeals processes, and 
a register of standby capacities. Additionally, 
the resolution created guiding principles 
for humanitarian assistance and called for 
coordinated support for prevention and 
preparedness measures.
The three pillars of the UN’s humanitarian 
reform agenda are: ensuring predictable 
funding, strengthening the humanitarian 
coordinator system, and improving 
humanitarian preparedness and 
response capacity.
To help cash-strapped humanitarian 
organizations, the Central Emergency 
Response Fund provides rapidly accessible 
grant monies. Two-thirds of grant monies 
are designed for newly emerging or rapidly 
deteriorating crises and one-third for 
core lifesaving activities in chronically 
underfunded crises. The fund is not intended 
to replace existing appeal mechanisms, but 
does provide cash fl ow for lifesaving and 
time-critical needs within 72 hours. The 
fund has pledges of $250 million USD and 
has a goal of creating $500 million USD 
in grant monies. 
To improve coordination between 
organizations, the UN has implemented 
a strategy to select, appoint, and train 
humanitarian coordinators, as well as to 
provide them with the tools to do 
their jobs. 
The Cluster Coordination Framework 
is critical to UN work to improve 
humanitarian preparedness and readiness. 
Introduced at an ad hoc meeting of the 
IASC Working Group in July 2005, the 
framework includes nine separate clusters: 
nutrition, water and sanitation, health, camp 
coordination and management, emergency 
shelter, protection, logistics, emergency 
telecommunications, and early recovery. The 
framework identifi es a lead organization 
for each cluster, such as the United Nations 
Children’s Fund which heads the nutrition 
and water and sanitation clusters. 
At the global level, the cluster lead’s role 
is to assess needs against current capacity, 
coordinate with other clusters across multiple 
indices, build required capacity, and conduct 
training and system development. 
At the country level, the cluster lead 
works to conduct needs assessments and 
analyses, identify available capacities, create 
response plans, and delegate commitments. 





Ofﬁ ce for the 
Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs 
United Nations 
The Humanitarian Reform Agenda and its Implications 
for Inter-Agency Information Management: 
A Focus on the Cluster Model
The United Nations introduced the Cluster 
Coordination Framework to improve 
humanitarian preparedness and readiness. 
assesses progress on an ongoing basis. While 
the cluster lead serves as an overseer rather 
than an implementer, it can also serve as a 
provider of last resort. 
As a brand-new model, the cluster approach 
was fi rst used to coordinate humanitarian 
response to the South Asian earthquake of 
October 2005. Humanitarian coordinators 
and country teams have also agreed to apply 
it to existing emergencies in Uganda, Liberia, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Why is this model important? It provides 
a vehicle for the relief community to 
defi ne information management roles and 
responsibilities, improve their understanding 
of information needs in the fi elds, and to 
develop common assessment formats and 
data standards. 
At the March meeting of the IASC 
Working Group, UNOCHA made several 
recommendations that would achieve these 
critical objectives: developing common 
standards within and across clusters; creating 
common systems for each sector as well 
as system-wide; identifying critical and 
strategic information needed for planning, 
priority-setting, gap identifi cation, impact 
analysis, and reporting; and establishing 
an information management task force. 
Participants at an interagency information 
management workshop held in Geneva 
in June recommended that the model also 
incorporate mechanisms for continuous 
learning and improvement.
Successes
The cluster model has sought to improve 
humanitarian response by grouping 
functional concerns together. Although 
it is a work in progress, it is moving the 
relief community forward towards better 
collaboration, centralization of authority, 




The Cluster Coordination 
Framework is an important 
tool for organizing 
humanitarian response. 
A lead organization 
heads each cluster. 
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emergency response. By assigning a lead 
organization to each of the nine clusters and 
defi ning key needs and responsibilities, the 
cluster model creates clarity and enhances 
accountability. Of equal importance, 
stakeholders can rapidly identify resource 
gaps and allocate funds where they are 
most needed. Grants from the Centralized 
Emergency Response Fund can help 
organizations meet the demands of certain 
crises, where time is of the essence. 
Shortcomings
As we learned in Pakistan, it’s not just 
responsiveness that needs to be improved, 
but also preparedness. Clusters must address 
the full range of humanitarian needs, such 
as transportation and infrastructure repair. 
We must provide better oversight for 
spending and prioritize cluster activities, so 
that we can operate effectively in resource-
constrained environments. Finally, we should 
delineate a chain of command in each 
cluster, so that organizations understand 
their responsibilities and can work together 
to meet key needs.
Moving Forward
To improve the cluster model, we must make 
some important top-level decisions. Who is 
in charge of the overall effort, from planning 
through implementation and enforcement? 
How can we collaborate with other 
frameworks that are evolving in country 
capitals across the world? And how do we 
implement the cluster approach in countries 
with weak governments or poor disaster 
management skills? 
Key tasks include prioritizing needs, 
measuring improvements, and implementing 
lessons learned. We must enhance support 
to HICs globally, to make sure we’re 
meeting disaster relief standards. And we 
should fi nalize our approach to information 
management, deciding whether it merits a 
cluster of its own or should be addressed 
across all of our clusters. 
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Colonel Alex Alderson 
of the UK Army (left), 
networks with Shawn 
Messick, Vietnam 
Veterans of America 
Foundation (center), and 
Eric le Guen, International 
Rescue Committee (right). 
In the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake, 
the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) set up an emergency shelter cluster 
to provide 3.25 million people with safe and 
dignifi ed shelter to survive the harsh winter. 
Seventy-two member organizations, including 
NGOs, IGOs, NATO, the Pakistani military, 
and the Pakistani Government, were involved 
in the project.
With winter coming, the project was 
extremely time-constrained. With IOM’s 
leadership, the group established a logistical 
network, created a technical working group, 
and involved the Pakistani Government’s 
Federal Relief Commission by week six of 
the initiative. At week ten, the group had 
established shelters and was conducting 
security surveys. By week twelve, IOM 
was providing umbrella-grant management 
services, and by week thirteen, the cluster 
was winterizing shelters and targeting 
resource distribution.
The group’s ability to work together 
effectively and rapidly helped prevent mass 
migration and excess secondary mortality 
and minimized displacement of the internal 
population. Additionally, the cluster concept 
worked for both funding and technical 
requirements, with group members respecting 
the guidelines IOM provided.
Successes
The Pakistan earthquake provided a 
testing ground for the cluster model. By 
creating a framework to coordinate agencies’ 
efforts, we were able to improve information 
sharing and integrate logistics. Key success 
criteria included our work with the HIC 
and access to the right experts, as well as 
our ability to improve collaboration in the 
fi eld and use common technical standards. 
Equally importantly, the cluster model 
provided common access to funding and 
increased accountability. 
Shortcomings
As a new model, the cluster approach 
needs some refi nement. We weren’t 
prepared to implement it in Pakistan, and 
had to adapt to new modes of working on 
the fl y. Additionally, there was some role 
confusion in the fi eld, as cluster leads were 
performing dual roles as coordinator and 
implementer. Other issues that arose included 
insuffi cient information sharing, poor quality 
control, and the lack of a post-emergency 
transition plan. 
Moving Forward
So how can we improve the cluster model? 
Many of the issues we experienced in the 
fi eld could be solved with stronger planning. 
We should develop future leaders, improve 
preparedness, and standardize information 
management plans and tools. Additionally, 
we should reach out to cluster members 
Brian Kelly




Experience as Cluster Lead for Emergency Shelter in 
Post-Earthquake Pakistan
Seventy-two organizations partnered on the 
emergency shelter cluster created in the 
aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake. The goal? 
To provide 3.25 million people with safe and 
digniﬁ ed shelter to survive the harsh winter. 
to counteract negative perceptions about 
centralizing coordination.
Funding is critical. With better funding, we 
would be able to enhance preparedness, 
meeting before and after emergencies to 
assess and fi ne-tune our responsiveness. 
Additionally, we could budget for key 
requirements such as technical units, 
quality control, guidelines, and information 
management. We need to communicate 
with our donors and involve them in the 
planning process to gain their support for 
preparedness initiatives.
To improve effectiveness in the fi eld, 
we should focus cluster leads solely on 
the coordinative role: Having the lead 
organization also serve as an implementer 
hinders its effectiveness and could lead to 
competition with other organizations over 
funding and operational duties. Finally, we 
should assess the cluster model’s impact on 
all participants and capture lessons learned. 
Dr. Susan Page Hocevar 
outlines the ground rules for 
designing ideal information 
sharing models. 
Phase One: Current Initiatives — Experience as Cluster Leader for Emergency Shelter in Post-Earthquake Pakistan20
The US Army Civil Affairs community 
provides two mechanisms for sharing 
information in the fi eld: a staff offi cer, 
who works with commanders on civilian 
matters; and a Civil-Military Operations 
Center (CMOC), which provides a venue for 
military, local nationals, IGOs, and NGOs to 
meet and discuss information needs. 
 
CMOCs are defi ned by their environment. 
In permissive environments, the centers are 
typically located outside the base, are open 
to members of the public with minimum 
credentials, and provide a full range of 
services. In semi-permissive environments, 
CMOC locations are determined by the 
threat level, are accessible to credentialed 
members of the public via appointment, and 
provide limited services. In nonpermissive 
environments, CMOCs are located inside 
a military base’s security perimeter, are 
accessible to credentialed members of the 
public via appointment, and implement 
high-level security measures.
CMOCs help users understand military 
culture. Army Civil-Military Operations 
have primary functions to establish and 
reinforce rule of law, establish and reinforce 
host nation legitimacy, restore essential 
services, and assist in economic development. 
To that end, CMOCs provide NGOs with 
current data on known minefi elds and threat 
levels, non-combatant evacuation operation 
information, and a venue to enhance 
information sharing and collaboration. 
The US Army Civil Affairs offi ce helps 
improve fi eldwork by funding projects, 
assisting in humanitarian aid distribution, 
establishing communications networks, 
and providing occasional military over-
watch services for events such as elections 
or investigations. Additionally, it shares 
information such as assessments, unclassifi ed 
maps, and metric analyses with other 
organizations and sends assessment teams to 
monitor key infrastructures. 
Successes 
CMOCs provide a means for armed forces, 
IGOs, and NGOs to discuss and share 
data on mine awareness, non-combatant 
evacuation operations, and information 
assessments, as well as increase their cultural 
understanding of each other. CMOCs have 
been useful in permissive and semi-permissive 
environments and help improve NGO 
and IGO perceptions of the armed forces 
as cooperative and collaborative. The US 
Department of Defense has made progress in 
the area of legitimizing the military’s role in 
stability and reconstruction operations (DoD 
Directive 3000.05).
Shortcomings 
There is still much that needs to be done 
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Information Sharing in Insecure Environments: 
An Armed Forces Perspective
CMOCs have been useful in permissive and 
semi-permissive environments and help improve 
NGO and IGO perceptions of the armed forces 
as cooperative and collaborative. 
the armed forces and the humanitarian 
community. Relief actors are slow to 
recognize each other’s accomplishments 
and often don’t use each other’s resources. 
The physical location of CMOCs – which 
are often on military compounds – reduces 
their access and increases NGO and IGO 
reluctance to use them. 
While the US Department of Defense has 
made progress in the area of openness, large 
policy issues and cultural differences between 
the US armed forces, NGOs, and IGOs 
require continued attention. Additionally, we 
don’t invest adequate resources in conducting 
pre-deployment training to provide civil-
military staff with skill sets needed for 
fi eldwork such as assessment, project 
management, and information management. 
Moving Forward
So how can we improve cooperation? A fi rst 
step is to focus on how we can change policy 
and how it should then be implemented. 
Next, we should identify the full range of 
areas where we can share information and 
resources. Finally, the US armed forces need 
to strengthen their civil affairs capabilities. 
We’re doing that by providing US Army 
Civil Affairs teams with doctrine and training 
in civil information management before they 
deploy to crises, as well as strengthening 
civil affairs capabilities within the US 
Marine Corps. 
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A breakout group discusses 
potential obstacles to 
cross-community 
information sharing. 
Civil and military organizations meet and 
work in the fi eld under a wide array of 
conditions including natural disasters, 
complex emergencies, non-permissive 
environments, and counterinsurgency 
operations. Our relationships often depend 
on one key factor: whether we are perceived 
as belligerent or non-belligerent. 
The security of NGO operations is dependent 
on community acceptance. Our expatriate 
staff work side-by-side along nationals, while 
our international NGOs work through local 
partners. We all develop local networks and 
local capacity.
NGOs are subject to multiple standards, 
including the Red Cross/NGO Code 
of Conduct, SPHERE guidelines, and 
organizational guidelines. We espouse the 
following principles:
•  Neutrality: Our aid will not be used to 
further a particular political or religious 
standpoint. 
•  Impartiality: Aid is given regardless of 
race, creed, or nationality and is based 
on need alone. 
•  Independence: Aid agencies shall not 
act as instruments of government or 
foreign policy. 
These principles impact our willingness to 
work with the military, as NGOs avoid any 
situation that would cause them to violate 
these principles, or even create the appearance 
of a confl ict of interest.
As we work in the fi eld, we are balancing 
our humanitarian mission to provide 
assistance to victims with very real personal 
security concerns. In addition, we strive 
to “do no harm,” realizing that aid can 
sometimes worsen situations rather than 
improve them.
It’s important to remember that most 
humanitarian emergencies do not involve 
the armed forces. NGOs enter a country at 
the host government’s invitation, after an 
emergency has crippled the country’s disaster 
response systems. Our work typically 
happens both before the military arrives 
and after it departs. 
There are many different actors in disaster 
relief, including UN agencies; the US, host, 
and other governments; NGOs; and donors. 
We use multiple structures to coordinate 
relief, both globally and in the fi eld. 
Ideally, our efforts are coordinated with 
the host government.
NGOs have some very real concerns 
about working with the armed forces. If 
the local population perceives that we are 
violating our principles, we could be 
denied access to the community or even 
become a target. In addition, we face 
diffi culties sharing information: There is 
often an inadequate distinction between 
appropriate information exchange and 
military intelligence gathering. As a result, 
NGOs would like to see the military refer 









Civil-Military Information Sharing in Insecure Environments: 
An NGO Perspective
We do, however, seek certain support services 
from the military, including security services 
and briefi ngs, convoy support, technical 
assistance, and access to remote areas, ports, 
and airfi elds. 
InterAction’s work with the military 
includes ongoing dialogue on civil-military 
relations in nonpermissive environments, 
which has resulted in recommended guidelines 
and Joint Pub 3-08 published on March 17, 
2006. We have seconded experienced NGO 
staff to the US Central Command and the 
Humanitarian Operations Center-Kuwait 
City, produced civil-military DVDs for NGO 
and military personnel, and participated in 
workshops and simulations. 
Successes
After much mutual mistrust, NGOs are now 
talking to the armed forces. InterAction is at 
the forefront of that effort, helping to develop 
and institutionalize NGO standards, a code of 
conduct, and guidelines that will protect our 
founding principles. 
Shortcomings
NGOs are wary of working with the armed 
forces, based on past experiences and 
perceptions. The armed forces’ militarization 
of humanitarian affairs is strengthening 
local perceptions that NGOs are displaying 
partiality in their work with the military. And 
this has sometimes been the case.
Moving Forward
Our current dialogue has not resolved 
the issue of how to integrate military and 
civilian efforts in relief operations. We need 
to work harder to understand each others’ 
organizational cultures. And we need to 
resolve process issues. NGOs prefer to work 
with a civilian body rather than collaborate 
directly with the armed forces. 
Potential Actors 
in Disaster Relief 
InterAction’s view of 
the potential actors 
involved in a disaster 
relief effort. 
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Phase Two: Designing Ideal Information 
Sharing Models
Building on the current initiatives shared 
by presenters, participants were challenged 
to create ideal designs for information 
sharing in insecure environments. Designs 
were defi ned as alternative approaches, 
models, frameworks, or images that could 
guide participant planning and behavior. 
Participants were encouraged to think 
creatively as many designs were possible and 
were contingent on context. 
To anchor discussions, participants were given 
a specifi c scenario: an insecure environment in 
which multiple communities, including NGOs, 
IGOs, governments, and the armed forces 
would be involved. Participants were asked to 
develop an ideal design that addressed scenario 
needs and constraints. They were encouraged 
to incorporate new initiatives, either ones 
introduced by the presenters or other ideas, as 
appropriate. Organizers assigned participants 
to four mixed community groups to balance 
representation from NGOs, IGOs, government 
civilians, and the armed forces in each group. 
Participants created four distinct models 
to respond to the challenges presented by 
the Aliya scenario. Summaries follow the 
scenario description below.
The Scenario: An Escalating 
Humanitarian Crisis in Aliya
There is a humanitarian crisis in the Dassem 
region of the fi ctional African country of 
Aliya. The crisis is caused by an upsurge in the 
level of violence from a long-running inter-
ethnic confl ict. A signifi cant percentage of 
the indigenous population is displaced from 
their homes and communities. The violence is 
sporadic but signifi cant, making it unsafe for 
indigenous civilians and international actors 
to live and work throughout the region of 
Dassem. The population, as well as the crisis, 
have spilled over into the border region of the 
neighboring country, Tango. 
A small UN peacekeeping mission has been 
overseeing the cease-fi re, now defunct, as 
observers. The UN Security Council has just 
passed a resolution under Chapter VII of 
the UN charter authorizing a major increase 
in the peacekeeping force and mandating 
the use of force to protect at-risk civilians 
living in the region. Under the auspices of 
this resolution, 14,000 UN peacekeepers 
will be sent to the region. However, their 
arrival and increased operational capability 
will likely materialize slowly over the next 
four to six months. In the interim, the 
original UN peacekeeping force will 
remain onsite, but will focus almost 
exclusively on observing and reporting 
on the situation and maintaining a 
military headquarters capability. 
The US has decided not to participate 
in the UN mission. However, the US has 
deployed a military Joint Task Force (JTF) to 
neighboring Tango to assist in the broader 
relief effort and to locate and destroy 
small bands of international terrorists that 
operate in the border region. The JTF was 
specially organized to assist relief efforts 
while accomplishing the combat mission. It 
has signifi cant capabilities in helicopter lift, 
surface transportation, medical care, logistics 
The scenario: The fi ctional country of Aliya, where an upsurge of violence is threatening 
residents and relief workers alike. How can groups optimize information sharing in this 
dangerous environment as they wait for UN peacekeepers to arrive? 
planning, and deployment of rapid reaction 
teams for security and intelligence.
Humanitarian relief and development 
organizations have been active in the region 
for many years, but have operated at a 
low level. Because of recent insecurity, they 
have had to cease most of their activities in 
Dassem, withdrawing operations to Tango. In 
anticipation of the infl ux of UN peacekeepers, 
relief organizations are dramatically and 
speedily increasing their capacity throughout 
the area: The number of groups present has 
tripled in the last three weeks.
Participants were instructed to brainstorm 
ideal models for information sharing that 
would work with scenario constraints, 
involve all key relief actors, and adapt to 
changing conditions. Group reports follow.
Design 1: A Temporal Model for 
Multi-Phase Operations
The group designed a consensual, transparent, 
and adaptive framework that will 
accommodate variable states of information 
sharing during different operational phases. 
The framework, which would be developed 
pre-crisis, would ensure the safe and effective 
supply of humanitarian assistance, while 
addressing key confl ict drivers.
The group assumed that not all organizations 
would participate, but those that did would 
help design collaborative processes and 
architectures, while continuing to refi ne their 
own internal tools. The group also assumed 
that information would be shared bilaterally 
and multilaterally and that resources for this 
initiative were unrestricted.
An ideal system would be developed pre-
crisis to allow for refi nement and community 
buy-in. It would recognize and accommodate 
for divergent organization priorities, build on 
current information sharing mechanisms, and 
create agreed-upon information requirements 
and standards. It would provide adequate staff, 
resources, and locations to enable easy access; 
incorporate multiple data sources; facilitate 
outreach; and capture lessons learned. 
Information to be shared would include 
geospatial and demographic data; 
intelligence on inaccessible areas; information 
on transportation, communications, and 
essential services infrastructure; security 
updates; key contacts and their roles, 
responsibilities, and locations; economic and 
political background data; information on 
what organizations are doing and where, 
including their capabilities and capacities; and 
data on the affected population. 
So how would the model work in Aliya? 
Pre-crisis, responding agencies would take 
the lead creating information management 
structures at the headquarters level. They 
would establish a standing working group 
to develop training, planning, and standardized 
tools such as common assessment forms, 
information collection plans, and information 
management mechanisms and capacity. 
Critical stakeholders, such as corporate 
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headquarters and donors, would collaborate 
on system design.
 
As confl ict develops in Aliya, an information 
management working group, comprised 
of a representative from each stakeholder 
organization, will create and manage a 
central clearinghouse to facilitate information 
fl ow. Using participants’ requirements as a 
guide, this working group will improve the 
information pool established pre-crisis, and 
facilitate information fl ow across and within 
organizations. After the crisis ends, the group 
will share lessons learned with the larger 
relief community so that all organizations can 
refi ne their processes. 
The model would address all of the different 
information types organizations need, and 
use the HIC to link relevant parties. The HIC 
would contribute to the effort by establishing 
key contacts and existing resources and 
information on potential intervention areas. 
The model would also use the cluster system 
at the fi eld headquarters level to adapt 
standards, collect information, and identify 
gaps. At the fi eld level, the cluster would 
coordinate operations. 
Design 2: Information Grid Framework
The purpose of this framework is to support 
national and international policy, provide 
material aid and protection for vulnerable 
populations, pursue development objectives, 
increase national and regional stability, 
and ensure personnel security. 
The group understands and assumes that 
information will not always be perfect, and 
that data types and formats may differ across 
organizations. Additionally, actors may 
withhold information at times, but will 
expect access to shared data. 
The framework would provide security 
and protection data, such as information 
on threats, incidents, and troop location; 
crisis and response updates; host nation 
demographics and environmental 
conditions; infrastructure data points (e.g., 
communication, transportation, power and 
water, and health services); political climate 
assessments; and general information on 
all external actors (e.g., mission, mandate, 
organization chart, and ROE). 
Information would be shared 
asynchronously, via web postings, e-mail, 
mailers, broadcast media, and the enterprise 
information system; and synchronously, via 
in-person meetings, video teleconferences, 
online collaboration and messaging, 
phone, or two-way radio. The group 
expects that asynchronous messaging 
would predominate. 
The group recommends that information 
sharing policies, procedures, and capabilities 
be established and managed within key actor 
centers. These centers would include the HIC 
or its equivalent; the armed forces (e.g., UN 
peacekeepers); and the military’s CMOC, or 
equivalent. A skilled information manager 
at each center will facilitate information 
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collection and distribution. Information will 
be shared with the host nation. 
An information standards committee, 
developed pre-crisis, would create common 
database formats and assessment coding 
categories. The group also proposed the 
establishment of centralized facilities, 
management personnel and tools, a 
communications infrastructure, and 
access rights. 
Design 3: Information Sharing 
Window and Flow Model
Key stakeholders for this model include 
the UN and Red Cross, the Joint Task 
Force, and NGOs. Ideally, they will have 
bought into the shared mission: to facilitate 
information sharing to alleviate and prevent 
suffering without compromising individual 
organizations’ mandates.
Stakeholders will work together on 
developing and maintaining standards, 
providing training, obtaining donor 
support and funding for standards and data 
collection, and sensitizing all parties to the 
importance of the model and its mission. 
The model recognizes that stakeholders 
will jointly determine what information is 
of common interest and how it is shared. 
The JTF and relief community will have 
overlapping information interests, but will 
also have requirements that are unique 
to individual organizations. For example, 
JTF information interests include: the 
number of displaced persons in Tango, 
locations of relief organizations’ operational 
areas, security information, and the 
status of transportation routes. The relief 
organizations’ information interests include: 
locations of populations at risk, security 
information, critical resource requirements, 
the location of JTF personnel (e.g., CMOC), 
maps, logistics (e.g., roads and their 
accessibility), and the location of all relief 
organizations’ operations.
Design 4: Ideal Security Model for 
Multi-Layer Information Sharing
The group compared the information 
management challenge to herding cats, 
noting that the information to be shared and 
exchanged will change over time, in terms 
of type, quality, frequency and amount. 
Key stakeholders would be involved at a 
regional level, and information sharing and 
management expectations would be 
explicitly addressed. 
The group identifi ed a wide array of 
information needs, including topographical, 
weather, demographic, and cultural data; and 
intelligence on local populations including 
their habitat, locations, movements, needs, 
protection concerns, and perceptions of 
humanitarian actors. The group wanted to 
know about local infrastructures, emergency 
services, and the location of mines and 
unexploded ordnance. The group wanted 
to receive safety and security updates and 
incident reports for both Aliya and Tango, as 
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well as obtain information on the movement 
and operations of troops. 
The group’s model incorporates dynamics 
that are horizontal at the fi eld level and 
vertical across fi eld operations; country 
or theatre-level managers; and corporate 
headquarters, donors, and other agencies. 
It assumes that the UN is serving as the 
primary coordinator at the fi eld operational 
level, and that coordination at the country 
level is occurring through the IASC. The 
model also incorporates mediating bodies 
at the local level following the ANSO and 
CMOC concepts.
The Group’s Perspective
After presenting their ideal designs, 
participants talked more generally 
about information sharing challenges 
organizations face in the fi eld. Several took 
issue with the term “ideal state,” since 
organizations can have widely divergent 
goals. Said one: “The presentations of 
ideal designs suggest that humanitarian 
organizations and the armed forces have 
a common goal. However that may be 
overstating the NGO perspective.” Another 
participant took this line of logic a step 
further, stating: “It may not always 
be true that NGOs want to help the 
armed forces achieve some of their 
goals more effectively.” 
The group decided to use the cluster 
framework as the best means to collect 
information, create a common assessment, 
and identify gaps. They also recommended 
the establishment of a civilian equipment of 
CIMIC to function as a coordination body.
However it plays out in the fi eld, increased 
cooperation allows all relief actors to 
work more effectively. It’s important to 
recognize that overlapping mandates 
and work processes mean that there will 
always be some redundancy in fi eld work, 
even if information sharing processes are 
optimized. Said one participant: “The 
information management challenge is like 
herding cats. But that implies that we are 
trying to get cats to become cattle, and I 
don’t agree that it would be appropriate 
or accepted.”
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Phase Three: Action Planning 
After presenting their ideal models for 
information sharing, participants were 
asked to identify initiatives that could help 
operationalize these designs, then narrow 
their focus to a single initiative for group 
consideration. Participants proposed 10 
initiatives. Highlights follow:
Initiative A: Establish interagency consultative 
planning to improve confl ict prevention. 
Begin planning at the early warning signs, 
rather than waiting for the actual crisis to 
occur. Identify what planning structures and 
assessment tools can be used to improve 
collaboration in crisis planning, without 
impeding NGO independent action. Engage 
multi-agency participants in advising the US 
Joint Forces Command on the development 
of a confl ict-prevention exercise scenario.
Initiative B: Improve practitioners’ 
understanding of organizational cultures 
so that groups can enhance cooperation during 
complex humanitarian emergencies. Increase 
awareness of organizational goals, mandates, 
rules of engagement, principles, and values. 
Address biases and attitudes that inhibit 
effective interaction. Embrace differences 
rather than attempting to change each another, 
either individually or organizationally. 
Initiative C: Establish an independent data 
standards working group to create practical 
standards for both analysis and operational 
support. Address implementation issues such 
as data maintenance, training requirements, 
and support for fi eld implementation.
Convene sectoral or specialist area sub-groups 
as needed. Consider deploying a knowledge 
offi cer to create the necessary architecture 
needed to implement new standards early in 
the crisis. 
Initiative D: Protect children in confl ict 
environments. Engage the armed forces on 
how best to provide protection to children 
and women. Develop education, training, 
exercises, and other tools. Address the issue 
of child soldiers.
Initiative E: Create a collaboration website 
for humanitarian assistance. Capture lessons 
learned and offer blog and online chat on 
topics of interest. Increase accessibility by 
having an NGO host the site. Ensure 
security, so that users can freely exchange 
information. Work towards the creation of 
a common operational picture in any given 
crisis situation.
Initiative F: Increase low-cost Internet access 
in isolated areas to promote information 
sharing. Involve local government 
stakeholders in setup, deployment, 
and ongoing support. 
Initiative G: Develop rapid, simple 
information sharing mechanisms. Create 
information sharing systems that can be 
deployed in the fi rst days of a crisis 
response. Systems should be simple and 
not technology-dependent.
Initiative H: Establish a pre-crisis working 
group for information sharing planning 
and procedures. Create a forum for multi-
From improving organizational cultural understanding, to creating pre-crisis working 
groups, to optimizing Humanitarian Information Centers, participants rose to the challenge 
of creating action plans that would improve information sharing for all stakeholders. 
organization stakeholders. Establish 
goals, procedures, and mechanisms for 
information sharing. Involve high-level 
participants to address policy issues as 
appropriate. Convene a pre-deployment 
group when the crisis is emerging or as 
emergency response teams deploy, if the 
crisis is unanticipated. 
Initiative I: Engage NGOs and IGOs 
in Department of Defense operational 
planning. Create a process to involve NGO 
and IGO communities in military planning 
for complex humanitarian emergencies. 
Identify appropriate contacts and motivate 
participation. This initiative was merged 
with Initiative A. 
Initiative J: Improve the HIC. Acknowledge 
and address past problems, identify 
improvements, and compile lessons learned. 
Engage donor support. Develop and conduct 
training. This initiative was merged with 
Initiative G.
After discussing all 10 initiatives, participants 
were asked to commit individually to a single 
action plan. Plans that received multi-sector 
interest from at least four participants were 
chosen for action planning. Five planning 
groups emerged from this self-organizing 
process, selecting the following initiatives for 
further development: 
•  Action Plan 1: Improving Organizational 
Cultural Understanding (formerly Initiative B)
•  Action Plan 2: Creating a Pre-Crisis 
Working Group on Information Sharing 
(formerly Initiative H)
•  Action Plan 3: Developing a Center 
of Excellence for Crisis Information 
Management (formerly portions of 
Initiatives A and I)
•  Action Plan 4: Improving the Humanitarian 
Information Centers (HICs) Initiative 
(formerly Initiatives J and G)
•  Action Plan 5: Implementing Integrated 
Planning for the US Joint Forces 
Command’s Unifi ed Action Exercise 
(formerly a subcomponent of Initiative 
A and I)
Participants were given worksheets and a 
presentation format to guide action planning. 
Workshop facilitators recommended that 
groups use Kurt Lewin’s Force Field Analysis 
technique to help focus discussion and 
development of their strategies. An 
overview of the fi ve action plans follows: 
Action Plan 1: Improving 
Organizational Cultural Understanding 
In order to enable information sharing, 
we must fi rst better understand each other, 
including our goals, intents, and biases. The 
intent is not to change the cultures, but to 
embrace the differences. We should ask each 
other: Is the issue trust or familiarity? We 
believe that familiarity leads to trust, or can 
clarify boundaries of trust.
The need for better cultural understanding is 
urgent. Changing operational environments, 
the emergence of new belligerents, and 
limited resources make information 
sharing imperative. 
While there are multiple initiatives under way, 
they are not well-coordinated. Since many 
information sharing initiatives are local, they 
may not be scalable or sustainable in other 
theatres of action. Additional constraints 
include limited training, resources, and 
outdated documentation. 
Enablers
Using the Field Force Analysis, the group 
discussed how real-world experiences 
reinforce the need for better cultural 
understanding. Other existing enablers 
identifi ed by the group included: senior 
leadership buy-in, a shared commitment 
to transparency, and access to technology. 
Military policy and doctrinal changes, such 
as DoD Directive 3000.05 are important, as 
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they motivate practitioners to deepen their 
understanding of other organizations. 
Barriers
There are real resource constraints, 
including funding, staffi ng, and technology 
limitations. Moreover, the range of players is 
vast. Many of the players are skeptical about 
each other’s motivations or fearful 
that their independence or impartiality 
could be compromised. 
Recommendations
To implement our action plan, we should 
undertake a gap analysis to examine current 
efforts and determine what is needed. Another 
priority is to build an online repository of 
training materials and events that can be 
accessed by all interested parties. We should 
also identify a lead agency for this program.
NGO and IGO personnel should be invited 
to participate in the National Defense 
University’s senior leader seminar program, 
joint and multi-national military exercises 
and key training center exercises, (e.g., the 
US Army Joint Readiness Training Center; 
the US Army National Training Center); 29 
Palms (the training facility for the US Marine 
Corps); and the Joint National Training 
Capability, Joint Forces Command).
Action Plan 2: Creating a 
Pre-Crisis Working Group on 
Information Sharing
To improve our operational effectiveness 
in crisis response, we developed two 
approaches to planning. The fi rst approach 
is used in a benign, pre-crisis situation. 
This would involve regular (e.g., annual 
or semi-annual) meetings of organizations 
that know they will fi nd themselves in some 
common environment facing a complex 
humanitarian emergency. The second 
approach is used when a crisis emerges 
to deal specifi cally with that particular 
incident. This latter approach builds and 
refi nes, as needed, on the work of the 
fi rst approach.
The graphic on the following page 
illustrates operational phases from a 
military planning perspective. As the 
workshop scenario demonstrates, there 
is a particular need to improve planning 
between the armed forces and relief 
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Action Plan 1:
The group outlined 
critical tools that 




organizations to address the transition 
between operational Phase III (Dominating) 
and Phases IV and V (Stabilizing and 
Enabling Civil Authority). The working 
group should use a consultative planning 
approach which acknowledges that 
operations are not strictly sequential. 
Such a process would address the 
challenging situations that occur when 
security deteriorates and the military 
returns to its Phase III (Dominating) mode 
while humanitarian organizations remain 
focused on reconstruction activities.
Recommendations
To implement our action plan, we would 
identify critical actors and obtain their 
buy-in, designate a facilitator for planning 
meetings, and establish information sharing 
needs and mechanisms. As a next step, we 
would create an inter-agency planning group 
to develop common formats, standards, and 
metrics. This group would also identify 
scenarios where the model should be applied 
and where it shouldn’t, develop lessons 
learned and best practices, and create 
interoperability requirements and 
communications mechanisms. 
Action Plan 3: Developing a
Center of Excellence for Crisis 
Information Management
Better crisis management meets a 
global need, saving lives and improving 
aid coverage. It contributes to the creation 
of a common operational picture, 
enabling groups to coordinate service 
delivery, identify gaps, focus resources, 
and cultivate responsibilities 
for participation. 
We propose to create a working group of 
organizations involved in crisis response 
to examine information issues before, 
during, and after crises. This group will 
develop clear, cross-sector expectations 
regarding information sharing. Members 
will educate senior policy makers on 
the benefi ts of improving information 
management to obtain their buy-in. 
The working group will defi ne minimum 
requirements and data outputs and 
develop fl exible systems and products 
that can easily be institutionalized. 
By involving stakeholders in the 
development process, we will ensure 
that tools meet their needs and build 
Action Plan 2:
The group used a military 
planning approach to 
outline operational phases 
during crises. 
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monitoring and assessment processes 
into system design. Enablers and 
barriers to this initiative are depicted 
in the graphic above. 
Recommendations
Creating practical data standards is 
critical to the success of this initiative. 
We need to identify subject matter experts 
who will champion our concept to the 
humanitarian community. We will use 
white papers and professional meeting 
participation to educate our peers on 
the need for data standards and win 
their support. 
Next, we will develop a cost/benefi t 
analysis for our donors, mobilizing their 
support for our effort. We will build 
outreach campaigns around timely 
issues, such as avian fl u, to raise public 
awareness for our cause. 
Our group was divided on the need to 
create a new “center of excellence” to 
accomplish these critical tasks; however, 
members generally supported the 
initiative’s goals and action plan.
Action Plan 4: Improving the 
Humanitarian Information Centers 
(HIC) Initiative
While the HIC is the most appropriate 
organization to address the humanitarian 
community’s information sharing needs, it is 
not currently meeting these needs. Among the 
reasons why: The humanitarian community 
lacks clear defi nitions for the inputs the HIC 
requires, the policies regarding the operational 
relationship between armed forces and the 
HIC are unclear, and organizations don’t see 
the value of their participation in the HIC. 
Each of these factors are detailed below and 
include specifi c recommendations. 
The HIC needs to clarify its relationship 
with three key communities: humanitarian 
organizations, the armed forces, and 
donors. The HIC needs to specify what it 
needs from the humanitarian community, 
identifying users’ information requirements, 
responsibilities, and expectations. Next, the 
HIC should develop data standards and 
information management processes. 
The HIC needs to develop norms for 
participation, with specifi c protocols that 
Action Plan 3: 
The group created a ﬁ eld 
force analysis for their 
initiative, Developing 
a Center of Excellence 
for Crisis Information 
Management. 
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clarify the nature of the HIC as a two-
way system. The HIC depends on the 
contributions of participating organizations, 
and these organizations have a responsibility 
to provide the HIC with what it needs. Once 
the HIC has defi ned input expectations and 
created information products, it should 
market its offerings and provide training to 
prospective participants. Clarifi cation of the 
interface and mutual responsibilities of the 
HIC and the Cluster model is also needed. 
The HIC’s policy and operational relationship 
to the armed forces can vary considerably, 
depending upon the nature of the crisis. 
The relationship can either be a primary 
one, with a liaison offi cer assigned to work 
directly with the HIC, or a secondary 
one, mediated by DART or the emergency 
management center. To overcome confusion, 
the HIC needs to provide clear guidance 
on how it interacts with the armed forces, 
what principles and guidelines govern its 
conduct, and what information is shared. 
The HIC can help improve the humanitarian 
community’s relationship with the armed 
forces by providing training on standards 
of engagement and leveraging IASC’s Civil 
Military Coordination Section for civil-
military information sharing. 
Donors can support the HICs and promote 
community cooperation by revising grants 
and contracts to include HIC reporting 
requirements, addressing the HIC’s role in 
training, and developing a unifi ed approach 
to reporting to facilitate information 
management among all NGOs. 
 
The HIC should implement a marketing 
strategy that provides an overview of its 
role, needs, and information products. The 
humanitarian community doesn’t see the 
value in working with the HIC, and the 
HIC needs to overcome this bias. One way 
to accomplish this objective is by specifying 
which information products the HIC can 
provide immediately and then set timetables 
for future product deliveries. To ensure that 
user data meets HIC needs, the HIC should 
provide examples of fi nal information 
products and provide user training. 
Additionally, the HIC should evaluate 
resource utilization, obtaining feedback 
from current and potential users. Of critical 
importance: tracking information requests 
and questions that weren’t met, as these needs 
may represent critical gaps and areas for 
further development. 
The HIC should also strengthen collaboration 
and coordination with ReliefWeb and 
highlight this relationship by putting 
ReliefWeb’s link, www.humanitarianinfo.org, 
on the front page of the HIC web site. 
Action Plan 5: Implementing Integrated 
Planning for the US Joint Forces 
Command’s Uniﬁ ed Action Exercise
The US Government seeks to create 
a standing advisory body with broad 
organizational representation that would 
provide input into its strategic planning 
process. The group would have input 
into confl ict assessment, policy planning, 
and operational and tactical planning. Its 
membership would include US and other 
national governments, the UN, IGOs, NGOs, 
the private sector, and the host nation. 
Currently, the US Government does not 
have an integrated planning process that 
systematically includes the perspectives 
of the international community and 
organizations such as NGOs and IGOs. 
As a result, organizations operating in the 
fi eld often duplicate each other’s efforts 
or work at cross-purposes. Involving 
stakeholders in integrated planning will 
likely improve organizational performance 
for all participants. 
To make the planning processes as effective 
as possible, the US Government should 
involve all of the right stakeholders. US 
Government offi cials should be able to 
speak on behalf of their agencies, national 
government representatives should represent 
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a consolidated position, and NGOs should 
participate either directly or via their cluster 
lead. Information should be exchanged at 
a high level, to keep planning simple and 
relevant for all parties. Policy experts should 
expect to lead the confl ict assessment process, 
obtaining input from all participants.
To create an environment conducive to 
sharing, the forum should be hosted at a 
neutral location and run by a third party or 
multiple sponsors. All comments should be 
off-the-record. Participants need to be able to 
share their perspectives freely and openly.
Recommendations
The action plan uses the US Joint Forces 
Command’s Unifi ed Action 07 exercise as a 
means to implement this integrated planning 
initiative. We will gain wide participation, 
using memos of understanding or verbal 
agreements, help organizations determine 
how they will participate, and identify 
organizations’ expectations for information 
sharing. Our goal is to create a systemic, 
sustained network to enable more effective 
performance in the fi eld.
We will experiment with different 
structures for the advisory board (e.g., 
direct involvement of NGOs and IGOs 
or use of representative organizations 
like Cluster Lead or InterAction), as well 
as ways to increase the effectiveness of 
its planning processes. We will research 
models from the United Nations (e.g., the 
Common Country Assessment, the political 
and military Integrated Mission Planning 
Process), the Center for Collaborative Policy, 
and the European Union’s approach to 
crisis early warning and consensus decision 
making, using best practices to design an 
organizational structure that will enhance the 
participation of all key stakeholder groups.  
Action Plan 5: 
The group assessed 
enablers and barriers 
to implementing 
integrated planning. 
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Facilitator and 
Participant Reflections
In workshop presentations, speakers ably 
described various information sharing 
structures, as well as the diverse strategies 
they implemented to meet the needs of key 
players and the changing conditions endemic 
to insecure environments. In our academic 
work, we have found that inter-agency 
cooperation falls along a continuum, from 
ad hoc organizing, to community-based 
organizing, to command organizing. Ad hoc 
systems depend on personal, face-to-face 
relations and evolve locally as relief actors 
seek to respond to crises. Until recently, much 
multiagency relief work has been ad hoc. 
Community-based organizing uses temporary 
mechanisms, such as task forces or centers, 
to facilitate information exchange at the fi eld 
level. Over time, the temporary strategies 
can become standard practice and may 
even be adopted by organizations as regular 
mechanisms to be activated whenever a crisis 
occurs. Examples include the United Nations 
Joint Logistics Center, HICs, and CMOCs. 
With command organizing, one group has 
the authority to coordinate all other entities 
in the crisis situation. This group lead serves 
as the chief decision maker, integrates all 
in-country activity at the fi eld level, and 
manages the information system and data 
repository. Examples include cluster leads in 
the UN’s Cluster Framework.
As presenters and participants discussed, 




Colonel Elvis Acosta, 
US Central Command; and 
Lieutenant Jason Darby, 
US European Command 
consider how to formulate 
an effective action plan.
different information sharing models. 
Although they did not use the organizing 
continuum to describe current initiatives, 
ideal designs, and action plans, most 
participants used language that indicated 
a desire to move away from ad hoc 
organizing to a community-based approach. 
However, some participants wished to 
maintain certain characteristics of ad hoc 
networks, such as organizational autonomy 
and fl exibility. One of the advantages 
of community-based organizing is the 
temporary nature of the mechanisms used, 
which can accommodate variations in 
participant commitment and engagement. 
Participants also signaled an interest in 
developing standard operating procedures, 
which defi ne roles to ease personnel 
transitions, make relationships more visible 
and explicit, and establish routines and 
procedures to facilitate operations. “Too 
often we start at ground zero when we enter 
a new confl ict or crisis,” said one. “Some 
of the issues we discussed at the workshop 
can help us avoid this.” From developing 
common assessment forms and data 
collection processes, to creating structures for 
pre-crisis planning for information sharing, 
to conducting inter-agency training and 
exercises, participants sought to formalize 
mechanisms and tools that would streamline 
information sharing processes and add value 
to the humanitarian mission. Participants 
urged the relief community to commit to 
continuous learning. Said one:
We need to look at a given crisis 
response situation and assess conditions 
before, actions during, and work 
after the crisis to fully understand 
our information requirements and 
how to create effective information 
management systems that respond to 
changing dynamics. This kind of in-
depth analysis could inform both our 
planning and training.
A potential impediment to moving towards 
a community-based approach is identifying 
who all the key stakeholders are. Participants 
did not agree on this issue: Some saw value 
in coordinating among groups like their own, 
while others saw value in creating centers 
that would serve the larger relief community. 
“We continue to face the challenge that the 
armed forces and humanitarian organizations 
are not often ‘on the same side,’” said one. 
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Brian Kelly, International 
Organization for Migration; 
Major John Mitchell, 
US Army Civil Affairs 
Command; Colonel Alex 
Alderson, UK Army; and 
Nan Buzard, American 
Red Cross, brainstorm 
key attributes of their 
action plan. 
But another participant said that these 
disagreements need not be insurmountable: 
It’s important that the armed forces and 
humanitarian communities have a mutual 
understanding of each other’s objectives, 
even if they disagree with one another. 
Collaboration may be the wrong model, 
but coordination is workable. How 
we accomplish this while maintaining 
adequate ‘separation’ is key.
How can the armed forces and humanitarian 
communities better understand each other? 
Several participants cited joint training and 
education opportunities. But one said that 
wasn’t suffi cient: “We need to have a long 
conversation between the humanitarian 
community and the military, from the 
grassroots level to the strategic policy level to 
identify the critical issues.” Only with high-
level leadership will the relief community be 
able to effect lasting change, said another. 
The desire for greater formalization expressed 
in participants’ presentations, initiatives, 
and action plans should not be construed as 
an effort to establish a command mode of 
organizing. It is possible to have decentralized 
decision making and formalized work 
routines. Participants want to retain their 
autonomous decision making authority 
and at the same time provide just enough 
formalization to routinize their work, 
gain effi ciencies, and facilitate information 
sharing and management within and among 
their communities. Judging by the time and 
attention they devoted to them, centers 
appeared to be the coordination mechanism 
of choice, suggesting that community-based 
organizing was much more compatible with 
their interests. However, current centers of 
coordination are not seen to be operating as 
effi ciently and effectively as they could be. 
In order to use them to their best advantage, 
participants sought to establish some 
rules, regulations, and standard operating 
procedures to systematize their use. In the 
fi nal analysis, then, this workshop can be best 
understood as a search for ways to coordinate 
effectively and effi ciently without hierarchy. 
We thank participants for their work and 
insights which prompt important questions 
for all organizations seeking to improve 
information sharing in current and future 
humanitarian initiatives. 
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As humanitarian emergencies grow in number 
and complexity, practitioners are increasing 
efforts to improve information sharing. 
Realizing that organizational biases and 
localized processes hamper responsiveness, 
organizations are creating tools and structures 
to enhance cooperation and data exchange. 
Global structures like HICs and the Cluster 
Framework and fi eld initiatives like ANSO 
and the Health Information Sharing Network 
of Iraq are signifi cant cases in point. 
The information challenge is a vast one. 
While crises receive the most attention 
and greatest donor response, pre-crisis 
planning is also important and can determine 
organizational effectiveness in the fi eld.
Organizations need to take a holistic 
approach to information sharing and 
management, creating the structures, tools, 
and processes that will help them plan 
for complex emergencies, perform work 
effectively on the ground, and learn from 
both their successes and shortcomings. 
Standardization is critical. Taking a cue 
from other industries, organizations are 
calling for the development of shared tools 
and processes that will help them improve 
information tools and usability.
Additionally, we need to create new ways of 
working alongside each other and in some 
cases, together. Practitioners will always 
have different mandates and objectives, 
but should nevertheless work cooperatively 
to create processes that focus on common 
objectives and respect cultural differences. 
As we work to achieve this goal, we need 
to improve current structures, such as HICs 
and CMOCs, which are underutilized and 
suffer from image problems. Additionally, 
relief organizations need to increase openness, 
involving all key practitioners in strategy-
setting and multi-agency exercises.  
“Selling” the concept of information 
sharing is critical to winning support and 
funds for broader initiatives. We need 
to involve policy makers and donors 
and educate the entire humanitarian 
community about the importance of current 
initiatives, as well as what new models 
will accomplish. We need leadership at the 
highest level to champion these initiatives if 
we are to create systemic change. 
Workshops such as this one help to clarify 
priorities. However, they are often narrow in 
focus and scope. We recommend broadening 
international participation in these events 
and bringing more NGOs to the table. In 
addition, we recommend focusing a future 
event on exploring information sharing in 
another context, such as civil society building 
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